Author: Fable 5.2 prompted by Matthew Bransgrove
Date: 22 November 2026
In brief
For two centuries a mortgage that reserved a higher rate of interest, and accepted a lower rate for punctual payment, was immune from the law of penalties. Courts called the distinction anomalous and applied it anyway. That immunity can no longer be relied on.
No appellate court has overruled the rule. But since 2021 single judges in New South Wales and Queensland have struck down the higher rate in a run of reported cases. In July 2026 a Federal Court judge said it is at least reasonably arguable that the rule is “ripe for reconsideration”, and that a higher rate is also an unfair contract term. The label on the rate has stopped mattering. What matters now is the size of the gap, whether the lender can prove why it is that size, and whether the mortgage already gives the lender an indemnity for the cost of default.
This paper traces how the law got here and what private lenders should do about it.
The convention
Every mortgage lawyer knows the drafting. The loan reserves interest at a Higher Rate, say 15 per cent. The lender agrees to accept a Lower Rate, say 10 per cent, for any payment made on time while the borrower is not in default.
Nobody expects the borrower to pay 15 per cent. The Lower Rate is the price of the loan. The Higher Rate is what the borrower pays if it defaults.
The clause is drafted that way round because of the law of penalties. Equity relieves against a sum imposed to punish default. A clause that increases the rate on default is exposed to that relief. A clause that reduces the rate for punctual payment was said not to be a penalty at all, because the lender is only withdrawing an indulgence.
The borrower pays the same amount under either clause. The whole difference is in the wording, which is why the courts have always been uneasy about it.
The Australian orthodoxy: criticised, then applied
Until about 2021 every Australian court that considered the rule accepted it, usually with an apology.
The High Court acknowledged it without examining it. As early as 1919 Isaacs J called the rule a well-known “anomaly” which equity had “firmly established”: Brett v Barr Smith [1919] HCA 4; (1919) 26 CLR 87 at 94. That was a tax case. Gibbs CJ stated the rule in O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 3; (1983) 152 CLR 359 at [5] of his reasons: there is no penalty where a rate of interest is agreed on condition that it will be reduced if payment is made punctually, because the creditor is granting an indulgence. In the same case Murphy J said at [2] of his reasons that to treat a higher sum, reducible if conditions are met, as non-penal “is to elevate form above substance”. The majority in Acron Pacific Ltd v Offshore Oil NL [1985] HCA 63; (1985) 157 CLR 514 at [6] of the joint reasons restated the indulgence principle, citing Gibbs CJ, without mentioning interest rates. None of these cases turned on the rule.
The Full Federal Court called it anomalous. In David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1990] FCA 148; (1990) 23 FCR 1 at [108]–[110], Lockhart, Beaumont and Gummow JJ described a “well-known, if not much praised, distinction”. They said it had been criticised as preferring form to substance, contrary to equity’s preference. “However anomalous”, it was well established. The Court did not need to apply it. The clause before it was an ordinary default margin of 1.5 per cent a year, running only from the date of default, and it was upheld.
Trial judges said it was time for change, and followed it. In King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain [2005] NSWSC 1076; (2005) 64 NSWLR 441 the rate was 118.8 per cent a year, reducible to 60 per cent if paid within seven days of the due date. Campbell J held at [138] that a clause structured that way is not a penalty, and added:
There is a lot to be said for the view that a clause which gives a benefit to a contracting party who performs the contract is no different in substance to a clause which imposes a detriment, equal in amount to that benefit, on a contracting party for breach. There is also a lot to be said for the view that equity ought look to substance not form. However, the law in this respect has been settled for too long for a first-instance judge to give effect to those views.
In Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Mars Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 726; (2007) 13 BPR 24,729 at [55], Windeyer J agreed “that while it may be time for substance to prevail over form a trial judge can do nothing but follow the established law”. The loans there carried lower and higher rates of 48 and 96 per cent, and 60 and 120 per cent, a year. No penalty argument was run, and the catchwords read: “In reality lower rate not concessional rate but expected rate”.
In Beil v Mansell (No 2) [2006] QSC 199; [2006] 2 Qd R 499 Chesterman J set out the rule at [23]–[24]. The clause before him was the other kind: 16 per cent a year, rising to 25 per cent on default. He held at [41]–[42] that such a clause is not a penalty merely because it raises the rate on default, but that this increase was extravagant and unenforceable.
The NSW Court of Appeal recorded the conventional view, and went around it. Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343; (2008) 77 NSWLR 205 was the appeal from Accom v Mars. This firm acted for the lender. Campbell JA said at [162] that there is “a conventional view that a properly drafted mortgage containing higher and lower rates does not attract the law of penalties at all”, because such a clause does not state the consequence of a breach. He proceeded on that basis at [163], though “there may be some room for argument about it”, and said at [164] that it was not his concern to consider whether the conventional view is correct.
It did not need to be decided. Campbell JA, with whom Hodgson and McColl JJA agreed, concluded at [161] that the default rate provisions should be set aside under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). By then the lender had offered an undertaking not to enforce one of the mortgages for more than the lower rate at simple interest. The memorandum already entitled the lender to recover all the loss and expense caused by a default. A higher rate on top, “even if such a provision is cast in a form that takes it outside the law concerning penalties”, was not reasonably necessary to protect any legitimate interest of any party (at [166]). Nor was it in the public interest for a lender to be profitable only when its loans go into default (at [168]). He added at [174] that a gap between the rates may still be justified where the mortgage does not otherwise cover the whole field of loss.
That reasoning is the seed of everything that has happened since. Three years later Young JA noted in passing, in Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149 at [47], that mortgages take this form because a higher rate for late payment might traditionally be set aside as a penalty.
Kellas-Sharpe: the high-water mark
The rule was attacked head-on in Queensland. The loan was $1,139,368 for two months. The standard rate was 7.5 per cent a month, with a concessional rate of 4 per cent a month while the borrower was not in default.
- 28 February 2012. Applegarth J applied the rule as “well-established”: PSAL Ltd v Kellas-Sharpe [2012] QSC 31. He added that, had the rule not applied, the borrowers had still not proved the 7.5 per cent rate was a penalty. He then held that charging and capitalising it for an extended period was statutory unconscionable conduct, removed the capitalisation and cut the standard rate to 5 per cent a month.
- 21 December 2012. The Court of Appeal dismissed the borrowers’ appeal: Kellas-Sharpe v PSAL Ltd [2012] QCA 371; [2013] 2 Qd R 233. Senior counsel had invited the Court to “consign the rule to history”.
- 6 June 2013. The High Court (Hayne and Keane JJ) refused special leave: [2013] HCATrans 133. The reason given was that, in light of the declarations made at trial, the borrowers had insufficient prospects of disturbing the orders actually made. The Court did not decide whether the rule is right.
The reasons are the best statement of why the rule survived so long.
- McMurdo P said at [3] that the criticism was not new, but “those in the commercial world have acted upon it for centuries”. It was not for the Court “to gainsay the long line of authority”.
- Gotterson JA said at [44] that the distinction does contradict equity’s preference for substance over form. But he was bound by other intermediate appellate courts unless they were plainly wrong, and feared replacing one anomaly with another.
- Fryberg J said at [57]–[59] that the rule was anomalous and had no economic utility in the 21st century. Any reform should be “examined nationally at the highest level”.
What the Court decided is narrower than the case’s reputation. The borrowers conceded that, if the rule applied, the clause could not be struck down. They asked the Court to abolish the rule. Gotterson JA held at [41]–[43] that this was not open to an intermediate appellate court. The High Court’s direction in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135] is that such a court should not depart from the decisions of other intermediate appellate courts unless convinced they are plainly wrong, and he was not so convinced. He also observed at [41] that members of the High Court have acknowledged the rule more than once, but that the Court has never affirmed it after a deliberate examination. The trial judge’s alternative finding, that the borrowers had not proved the 7.5 per cent rate to be a penalty in any event, was not challenged (at [50]).
Later trial judges took the hint. In Stoyanova v Equity-One Mortgage Fund Ltd [2016] VSC 414, Riordan J concluded at [37] that the rule “is anomalous and can only be attributed to the elevation of form over substance”, but that a judge at first instance was not at liberty to reconsider it, so the claim must fail at trial. He still declined to dismiss the penalty claim summarily. One of his reasons, at [38], was that the High Court has never affirmed the rule after a deliberate examination and there must be some prospect that it will reconsider it.
Other judges applied the rule without criticism. In Oak Capital Mortgage Fund Ltd v Dlakic [2019] NSWSC 1538 the rates were 9.95 and 19.5 per cent a year. Fullerton J rejected the penalty argument at [103]–[105] because the borrowers led no evidence, and added at [106] that the structure appeared in any event to be outside the penalty doctrine. In Jin Lian Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v ACapital Finance Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 931 the rule was common ground. Stevenson J said at [36] that the distinction “has survived, and is unaffected by” Andrews and Paciocco.
In Oxygen Funding Solutions Pty Ltd v Dick-Telfar [2020] NSWSC 582 at [80], the rates were 4 and 10 per cent a month, and the borrowers attacked them as unconscionable. Adamson J said it was “irrelevant that 10% cannot possibly be a genuine pre-estimate” of loss. Trial judges and intermediate courts had “railed against” the consequences of the distinction, yet it had been said time and again that the principle was “too well established to be disturbed other than at the highest level, by the High Court or by Parliament”. The rates stood.
That was the position when the Essential Guide to Mortgage Law in Australia was written. The device was a fiction, everyone said so, and it worked.
What changed underneath: Andrews and Paciocco
Two High Court decisions undermined the rule’s foundations without mentioning it.
Andrews (2012). In Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR 205 the Court held that the penalty doctrine remains a doctrine of equity and is not confined to sums payable on breach of contract (at [45]–[50], [63]). A stipulation is prima facie a penalty if, “as a matter of substance”, it is collateral to a primary stipulation and imposes an additional detriment when the primary stipulation fails (at [10]).
That cuts away the reasoning in Kowalczuk. The conventional explanation, as Campbell JA recorded it, was that a concessional rate clause does not state the consequence of a breach. After Andrews, breach is not required.
Andrews also kept a distinction that lenders can still invoke. At [79]–[82] the Court contrasted a stipulation that secures performance of another obligation with one that gives a party the right to do something on paying an agreed price, as in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham [1966] 2 NSWR 717. The second kind is not a penalty. A lender can say that the higher rate is simply the price and the lower rate an agreed alternative. But the test is one of substance. In Aquamore and Bellas, discussed below, the higher rate was found in substance to secure that the borrower would not default.
The timing matters. Andrews was delivered on 6 September 2012, two days after Kellas-Sharpe was argued in the Court of Appeal and three months before it was decided. It appears in the Court of Appeal’s reasons only in two footnotes. In one, Gotterson JA says the Kowalczuk rationale “may require re-expression” to accommodate it. So Andrews did not move the Court of Appeal to abandon the rule, and it is difficult to say that Andrews alone has overtaken Kellas-Sharpe.
Paciocco (2016). In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28; (2016) 258 CLR 525 the majority widened the inquiry beyond a “genuine pre-estimate of loss”. As Kiefel J put it at [29], the question is whether the sum is “out of all proportion to the interests of the party which it is the purpose of the provision to protect”. Nettle J dissented on the penalty question.
The case concerned a credit card late payment fee, not a rate of interest. But Keane J said at [263]–[264], citing Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752, that a borrower in default “is not the same credit risk” as the borrower with whom the loan was negotiated, and that risky credit is more expensive credit. He added at [283] that the interests a lender may protect include losses too remote to be recovered as damages. Even Nettle J, in dissent, contrasted the flat fee at [328] with the kind of interest rate increase that Colman J had held in Lordsvale could be justified because riskier credit is more costly credit.
That cuts both ways for lenders. A default margin can now be justified by interests wider than damages for breach, such as the higher credit risk of a borrower in default and the cost of provisioning against impaired loans. Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328; (2016) 93 NSWLR 231 upheld a plain default margin of 2 per cent on that basis. Fayad v B & G Properties Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 129 upheld a step from 25 to 30 per cent.
But once an honest default margin can be defended on its merits, the fiction loses its purpose. A court no longer needs the higher and lower rate device to save a reasonable margin. And it has a ready test for condemning an unreasonable one. Paciocco was decided four years after Kellas-Sharpe, so the Queensland Court of Appeal has never considered the rule in its light.
The first cracks, 2021 to 2023
The rule was not overruled. Trial judges began to find that particular clauses fell outside it.
14 July 2021: a drafting slip. In Priority Lending Australia Pty Ltd v Martinsville Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 850 the loan had a “discounted rate” of 3 per cent a month and a “normal rate” of 9 per cent. The interest clause used terms that the schedule of rates did not. On a motion to set aside default judgments, Adamson J said at [35] that, in part because of that discrepancy, this was not “such a clear case” of a clause in the same category as the one held valid in Kellas-Sharpe. Whether it was a penalty was a triable issue. This was the same judge who had stated the rule so firmly in Oxygen Funding a year earlier.
21 December 2021: a doubling. In Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd v Hung [2021] NSWSC 1681 the “Lower Rate” was 2.5 per cent a month and the “Higher Rate” 5 per cent a month, compounding, on a first mortgage development loan. Clause 5.2 reserved the Higher Rate and accepted the Lower Rate while there was no default. Meagher JA said at [113] that it was no doubt drafted that way to avoid the penalty argument by granting an indulgence. But clause 7.1 applied the Higher Rate only while an event of default subsisted, and the lender did not contend that the Higher Rate was the agreed rate (at [114]–[115]). It was clause 7.1 that the judge went on to test.
Applying Paciocco, his Honour held at [142] that a step from 30 to 60 per cent a year was, on the face of it, out of proportion to any increased credit risk. It applied on any event of default, “whether serious or otherwise” (at [140]). The lender’s interests on default were substantially protected by its indemnity and costs covenants (at [139]). The only purpose of the doubling was to secure that there would be no default (at [145]). Clause 7.1 was unenforceable as a penalty and no interest was recoverable at the Higher Rate (at [146]–[147]). The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal about the mortgagee’s sale on 16 December 2022, recording at [13] that the penalty finding was “no longer the subject of appeal”: Hung v Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 272.
22 June 2023: default fees on top. In First Cash Flow Solutions Pty Ltd v Saad [2023] NSWSC 686 the “lower” rate was 2.15 per cent a month and the “base” rate 4 per cent. Robb J left the rates alone, saying at [42] that there was no scope to criticise them given the risks of the advance. Whether the base rate was a penalty was not argued. He struck down a weekly $1,100 payment default fee charged as well (at [58]). Weekly interest of $428 rose to $797 at the base rate and to $1,897 with the fee. The lender was already protected by capitalised interest, a separate fee for dishonoured direct debits and a complete indemnity (at [61]). The borrower did not appear; the judge raised the point himself.
10 October 2023: the higher rate itself. In Bellas v Powers [2023] NSWSC 1198 a $3 million two-month loan carried a “Discounted Rate” of 1.75 per cent and a “Standard Rate” of 9.75 per cent, each per 30 days. The lenders argued that the Standard Rate was the primary obligation, which is the premise of the convention. Robb J rejected that at [83], reasoning by parity with Aquamore on a facility he described as materially identical.
- The Standard Rate was payable only while an event of default subsisted. The primary stipulation was that no event of default should occur, and the Standard Rate clause was collateral to it (at [75]).
- The trigger was an event of default, which need not be a breach. Robb J contrasted Kellas-Sharpe at [42], where the higher rate depended on the borrower being in breach of contract.
- Only two of the sixteen events of default were breaches of contract (at [49]). After Andrews that did not matter.
- The lenders identified no legitimate interest beyond earning the most the market would bear (at [73]).
- A first mortgage over two properties significantly diminished the lenders’ risk (at [74]). A default management fee and an indemnity already compensated them for the cost of default (at [76]).
The increase, from about 21.3 to 118.6 per cent a year, was exorbitant (at [79]). The Standard Rate terms were void and unenforceable (at [96]).
Bellas is the turning point. The lenders put the premise of the convention to the judge, and he treated the question as one of substance and proportionality.
The rule still has defenders
The trend is not uniform, and the rule remains binding in form.
Commercial N v Huang (2024). In Commercial N Pty Ltd v Huang [2024] NSWSC 23 the loan was $430,000 for 26 weeks. The lower rate was 0.35 per cent a week (18.2 per cent a year) and the higher rate 1.36 per cent a week (70.72 per cent a year). Henry J held at [213]–[225] that the higher rate was not a penalty, adopting Fullerton J’s reasoning in Oak Capital. The liability to pay it arose “because the reduced rate has not been paid punctually”, not as an additional liability on default. Her Honour accepted that this “may appear to apply a matter of form over substance”. She added that the borrowers, who led no evidence, had not shown the rate to be penal in any event.
The win was worth less than it looked. The rate of 70.72 per cent was held not to be unconscionable, but capitalising and compounding it was (at [302]–[306]). The borrowers were entitled to have the compounding provisions declared void or removed under the Australian Consumer Law and the ASIC Act (at [307]). The lender was entitled to judgment for the principal and simple interest at the higher rate (at [364]). As at August 2022 it was claiming about $3.2 million on the compounding basis, against about $1.3 million on simple interest (at [304]). The judge also found the compounding provisions unjust under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), but gave no separate relief under that Act (at [326]–[329]).
Later judges have confined Huang. In JCP Holdings Pty Ltd v Ulrich Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 911 at [93], Pike J said it rested primarily on the drafting of the clauses and on Kellas-Sharpe, and that it gave no support to a lender defending a default rate on its merits.
High rates that are honestly priced. A high rate is not penal merely because it is high. In Bhundia v Sommers (No 4) [2021] NSWSC 455 default interest of 30 per cent a year, compounding monthly, on a short-notice unsecured loan was not shown to be a penalty. The guarantor led no evidence, and Adamson J noted at [38] that the default rate was well below the effective price of the loan itself. White J’s earlier summary in Bay Bon Investments Pty Ltd v Selvarajah [2008] NSWSC 1251 at [54]–[56] is still applied: the disparity must be so great that the rate operates as punishment and not as compensation for being kept out of the money.
So the rule still wins on the right facts before the right judge. But even its defenders now police the result through statutory unconscionability, as Applegarth J did in 2012 and Henry J did in 2024. A lender who wins the penalty point and loses the compounding has not won much.
2025 and 2026: the run of losses
6 May 2025: Queensland, the classic drafting. KF Garty Pty Ltd v Prasad [2025] QSC 91 concerned a six-month loan of $600,000. The “Interest rate” was 8 per cent a month. The lender would accept a “Concessional rate” of 4 per cent a month if no event of default occurred. That is the convention exactly as the textbooks prescribe it.
Smith J declared the 8 per cent rate a penalty, void and unenforceable, on the application of self-represented defendants to set aside part of a default judgment. The reasons follow Aquamore and Bellas and cite Paciocco. But the operative finding is in the language of the older test: doubling the rate was “not a realistic estimate of the damages”, and was out of proportion to any damages that could be awarded for the breach.
The reasons do not mention Kellas-Sharpe, a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal on almost identical drafting which bound the judge. Nor do they record the lender arguing that the concessional structure took the clause outside the penalty doctrine. That makes Garty weak authority against the rule.
15 August 2025: New South Wales again. In JCP Holdings Pty Ltd v Ulrich Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 911 a short bridging loan of $450,000 carried default interest of 8 per cent a month, capitalised monthly. That worked out at about 151 per cent in the first year and 382 per cent in the second. This was a plain default rate, not a higher and lower rate clause. The borrowers bore the ultimate onus. But Pike J held at [89] that the contract itself was evidence capable of casting an evidentiary burden on the lender, which led no evidence of any interest the clause protected. It was a penalty, and the lender recovered no default interest at all.
8 July 2026: the Federal Court doubts the rule. In Albarran (Liquidator) v Kimberly Pearl Tours Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 877 two facilities used the defined terms “Higher Interest Rate” and “Lower Interest Rate”. The higher rate was 4 per cent a month, or 48 per cent a year. The lower rate was 2 per cent a month in one facility, and 1.7 or 3 per cent a month in the other. The lenders relied on Gibbs CJ in O’Dea to say the penalty claim was untenable. Feutrill J restrained the receivers and the lender that appointed them from selling the company’s property until final judgment or further order. This was an interlocutory decision, not a final finding, but his Honour’s reasons at [53]–[57] go further than any earlier judgment.
- It is “doubtful that the anomalous distinction”, which “plainly favours form over substance”, constrains what is an unfair term under the ASIC Act.
- It is “also possible” that the distinction “may not now survive scrutiny” after Andrews and Paciocco.
- It is difficult to distinguish logically between a bond to pay double unless the loan is repaid on time and interest at a rate that is halved if paid on time. “It is incongruous that one should potentially be a penalty and the other not.”
- “At the very least, it is reasonably arguable that the well-established distinction to which reference is made in Kellas-Sharpe is ripe for reconsideration in light of Andrews and Paciocco.”
He held at [133] that it was reasonably arguable that the Higher Interest Rate terms were penalties and unfair terms. That was one of four matters supporting an arguable case of unconscionable conduct under s 12CB of the ASIC Act. The injunction itself turned mainly on the receivers’ proposed sale of the company’s vessels. But the higher rate point had a practical effect. The lenders said any injunction must be conditioned on payment of at least the interest into court. The judge refused at [195], because there was “a good argument that payment of interest at the Higher Interest Rate is a penalty and unfair term”. No money had to be paid into court.
23 July 2026: two NSW judgments on one day.
In Haiyong Su v 5 Blackman Cres Macquarie Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 875 McGrath J dealt with a $100,000 loan between parties who were not sophisticated lenders or borrowers, secured by equitable mortgages. The deed called 2 per cent a month the “Discount Interest Rate” and 3 per cent a month the “Interest Rate”, both compounding. The lender argued that the 3 per cent rate could not be default interest because of those labels.
His Honour set out the traditional rule from Fisher and Lightwood and then held at [263] that the nomenclature is “not determinative”. A rate that increases from 2 to 3 per cent on default is a default rate “in the sense necessary to engage the penalty doctrine”. The reasons do not say why the rule they had just set out did not govern; Kellas-Sharpe is mentioned only inside a passage quoted from the textbook. The borrower bore the onus of proving a penalty. But the deed itself was evidence capable of casting an evidentiary burden on the lender (at [264]), who led no evidence that the increase was commercially justified. The security meant his risk did not materially increase on default. The clause operated in terrorem and he recovered at 2 per cent. The gap here was only 1.5 times.
In Blackbird First Mortgage Corporation Pty Ltd v Cam Engineering & Construction Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 876 the “Interest Rate” was 2 per cent a month and the “Default Interest Rate” 4 per cent. This was an ordinary increase on default, not a higher and lower rate clause, so the convention was not in issue. The case matters for its reasoning on proportion. Muston J held the default rate a penalty, citing Leeming JA in Fayad for the proposition that what matters, as a matter of substance and not form, is the extent of the increase.
- A doubling is not the “small rateable increase” on default that Colman J described in Lordsvale, the decision Keane J relied on in Paciocco at [263].
- It was disproportionate enough to shift the evidentiary burden to the lender, which led almost no evidence.
- The lender’s default costs were already covered by separate indemnities, so the increase could not be cost recovery.
- The loan refinanced one already in default. The borrower was a poor risk from day one, so “worse credit risk on default” explained little.
- The only real purpose was to deter default.
The Court found nothing inherently penal in monthly compounding. It severed only the sentence imposing the default rate, and interest continued at 2 per cent.
8 September 2026: Queensland, with expert evidence. Parker Wells Pty Ltd v Lenn Financial Services Pty Ltd [2026] QSC 207 is the most troubling decision for careful lenders. The facility had a “Lower Interest Rate” of 2.15 per cent a month and a “Higher Interest Rate” of 3.5 per cent. The guarantor’s unconscionability claim failed and the securities stood.
The labels suggest the convention, but the case was not decided on it. On its proper construction the Higher Interest Rate was the aggregate of the two rates, 5.65 per cent a month, payable while an event of default subsisted. Hindman J treated it as an ordinary uplift on default. Her Honour said at [81] that this was “not the type of case where the higher interest rate is the standard rate”, a structure which “generally does not give rise to considerations of the penalty doctrine”, although the difference is largely one of form. Kellas-Sharpe is not cited. So Parker Wells does not decide against the convention. It matters for what it says about justifying a default margin.
Unlike the lenders in the New South Wales cases, these lenders led evidence. Both experts said an uplift of 2 to 3 per cent a month was the most common in the short-term bridging market. Hindman J still held the default rate a penalty.
- Staff time, recovery costs, legal and valuation fees and cost of capital were all recoverable separately under the indemnity and default charges.
- That left only intangible loss and the higher risk of a borrower in default to justify the whole uplift, which they could not.
- The experts had not considered the uplift together with an all-encompassing indemnity. “Everyone else does a similar thing” does not change the character of the clause.
- Kowalczuk was applied: where the lender can recover all its default losses independently, a higher default rate is not reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate interest.
The standard rate of 2.15 per cent a month was applied during default.
Squaring the cases with Kellas-Sharpe
Kellas-Sharpe is a decision of an intermediate appellate court. It binds single judges in Queensland. Elsewhere, Farah directs judges not to depart from it unless convinced it is plainly wrong. None of the recent judgments says that it is. They reach their results in three other ways.
- By distinguishing it. In Kellas-Sharpe the lower rate applied “while the Borrower is not in default”, which Gotterson JA read at [52]–[53] as a default by the borrower’s own act, such as a failure to pay. In Bellas the higher rate applied while any event of default subsisted, and most of the events of default were not breaches at all. In Martinsville (No 2) the drafting was inconsistent. In Aquamore the lender did not contend that the Higher Rate was the agreed rate. In Parker Wells the “Higher Interest Rate” was, on its true construction, an uplift on default. These decisions are consistent with Kellas-Sharpe. What they show is how little it takes to fall outside it.
- By not engaging with it. Garty does not mention Kellas-Sharpe, although it bound the judge and the drafting was the classic form. Su sets out the traditional rule and then holds that the labels are not determinative, without saying why the rule did not govern. These are the decisions most exposed on appeal.
- By going around it. Statutory unconscionability and the unfair contract terms regime do not depend on the rule at all.
Two of the recent losses were never about the convention. JCP Holdings and Blackbird concerned plain default rates. They matter for how a margin is justified, not for whether the device works.
Only Albarran confronts the rule directly, and it is an interlocutory finding that the point is reasonably arguable. Feutrill J’s suggestion is that the distinction may not survive Andrews and Paciocco. If a court is to hold Kellas-Sharpe plainly wrong, that is the likely path: the Queensland Court of Appeal had Andrews before it only in footnotes, and Paciocco not at all. Against that, Stevenson J said in Jin Lian that the distinction has survived both decisions, though the rule was not in dispute before him.
| Decision | Clause | Treatment of Kellas-Sharpe | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aquamore (2021) | Higher / lower | Lender did not rely on the convention | Penalty finding not appealed |
| Bellas (2023) | Higher / lower | Distinguished | Separate questions, contested |
| Huang (2024) | Higher / lower | Followed | After a final hearing; compounding unconscionable under statute |
| Garty (2025) | Higher / lower | Not mentioned | Default judgment set aside in part; defendants self-represented |
| JCP Holdings (2025) | Default rate | Not in issue | After a contested hearing |
| Albarran (2026) | Higher / lower | Doubted | Interlocutory |
| Su (2026) | Higher / lower | Rule set out, not applied | After trial |
| Blackbird (2026) | Default rate | Not in issue | After a final hearing |
| Parker Wells (2026) | Default rate, on its construction | Not cited; convention said generally to be outside the doctrine | After trial |
The second front: unfair contract terms
The penalty doctrine is no longer the only route. A higher rate in a standard form small business loan can also be attacked as an unfair term under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). The regime was widened from 9 November 2023, for contracts made or renewed, and terms varied, on or after that date.
- Standard form. The contract must be a standard form contract. If the borrower alleges that it is, that is presumed unless the lender proves otherwise (s 12BK).
- Small business. A loan is a small business contract if the upfront price is not more than $5 million and the borrower either employs fewer than 100 people or has a turnover under $10 million (s 12BF(4)). Interest is disregarded in working out the upfront price of a loan (s 12BF(5)). The Australian Consumer Law has no upfront price cap, but loans fall under the ASIC Act, which kept one.
- Unfair. A term is unfair if it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations, is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party it advantages, and would cause detriment if relied on (s 12BG(1)). The second element is presumed against the lender unless the lender proves otherwise (s 12BG(4)).
- The price exemption. A term that sets the “upfront price” is exempt. But the upfront price excludes consideration that is contingent on an event occurring or not occurring (s 12BI).
- Consequences. An unfair term is void (s 12BF(1)). Separately, proposing an unfair term, or applying or relying on one, is a contravention that attracts civil penalties, and each unfair term proposed is a separate contravention (s 12BF(2A)–(2C)).
Lenders’ advisers have argued that a properly drafted higher rate is the upfront price, with the lower rate a concession. That is the same formal argument that is failing in equity. In Albarran Feutrill J held it reasonably arguable that a higher rate of twice the lower rate, payable on non-payment of interest by the due date, is an unfair term. That was a finding of arguability on an interlocutory application, not a final decision. The judge noted at [46] that the documents appeared to be standard form. The reasons do not examine whether the loans were small business contracts or whether the higher rate was part of the upfront price.
The statutory route matters because it needs no appellate court to abandon Kellas-Sharpe. A judge who feels bound by the rule in equity is not bound by it under the statute. And an unfair term exposes the lender to a penalty, not merely to losing the margin.
Statutory unconscionability is the third route. It reduced the lender’s recovery in PSAL v Kellas-Sharpe and Commercial N v Huang even though the higher rate survived the penalty argument in both.
The oldest example is Kowalczuk. The Court of Appeal assumed the higher rate was outside the law of penalties and set it aside anyway under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). That Act does not protect corporations, but its reasoning has now been carried into the penalty doctrine itself in Parker Wells.
Where the law now stands
The rule has not been overruled, and it can no longer be relied on to protect lenders. Both statements are true.
Formally. Kellas-Sharpe is intermediate appellate authority and special leave was refused. A trial judge can still apply the rule, as Henry J did in 2024, and Hindman J accepted in 2026 that a higher rate which is the standard rate generally does not attract the penalty doctrine. But the New South Wales Court of Appeal has never endorsed it after argument: Kowalczuk recorded the conventional view and expressly left open whether it is correct. And a Federal Court judge has now said it is at least reasonably arguable that the rule is ripe for reconsideration.
In practice. Trial judges have found four ways around it.
- Andrews. Breach is no longer required, so a concession withdrawn on an event of default is a collateral stipulation like any other (Bellas).
- Construction. A slip or inconsistency in the drafting can take the clause outside the rule (Martinsville (No 2), Bellas, Parker Wells).
- Paciocco directly. The court asks whether the gap is out of proportion to the lender’s legitimate interests and never reaches the rule (Aquamore, Garty, Su).
- Statute. Unconscionable conduct and unfair contract terms apply whatever the form (Kellas-Sharpe at trial, Huang, Albarran).
What decides the cases. Across the decisions the same factors recur.
- The size of the gap. A margin of 2 per cent was upheld (Sayde). So was 25 to 30 per cent, a relative increase of one fifth (Fayad). A doubling failed in Aquamore, Garty and Blackbird. A step of 1.5 times failed in Su, and 2.15 to 5.65 per cent a month failed in Parker Wells. The one recent survivor, the fourfold step in Huang, was decided on form and then cut down under statute.
- Double recovery. This recurs in almost every loss and is often decisive. Where an indemnity, capitalised interest or default fees already cover a cost of default, the margin cannot be justified by that cost (Kowalczuk, Aquamore, Saad, Bellas, Blackbird, Parker Wells). The lender must point to an interest those provisions leave uncompensated. Almost every mortgage contains such an indemnity.
- Onus. The legal onus of proving a penalty stays on the borrower. But a large enough increase, or the document itself, can cast an evidentiary burden on the lender to explain the margin (JCP Holdings, Su, Blackbird). Under the unfair contract terms regime the onus on legitimate interest is on the lender by statute. A borrower who leads nothing can still fail, as in Oak Capital, Bhundia and Huang. But where the increase is large on its face, a lender with no evidence loses.
- Evidence. In Bellas, Su and Blackbird there was no evidence that explained the size of the margin, and in Aquamore the judge reasoned from the face of the document. In PSAL v Kellas-Sharpe the lender led evidence of its cost of funds, its risk and market rates, and the judge would have found that the borrowers had not proved a penalty. But evidence of market practice alone is not enough: the lenders in Parker Wells led it and lost.
- Breadth of the trigger. A higher rate triggered by any event of default, however trivial, is harder to justify than one triggered by non-payment (Aquamore, Bellas).
- Security. Good security weakens the argument that default greatly increases the lender’s risk (Bellas, Su).
One further point is unresolved. A penalty is unenforceable, and the court does not substitute a reasonable rate. In Su and Blackbird the lender fell back to the lower rate. A lender whose documents do not clearly preserve a lower rate after default may be left with nothing but court interest, which was Pike J’s provisional view in JCP Holdings.
The High Court did not examine the rule when it refused special leave in 2013, and has not done so since. Whether the rule would survive there is unresolved. On the present trend, a lender should not count on it.
What lenders should do
Price risk in the Lower Rate. The Higher Rate is for the additional risk and cost of a loan in default, and nothing else.
- Stop relying on the label. Keep the higher and lower rate drafting while Kellas-Sharpe stands. It won in Huang, and Parker Wells accepts that it generally keeps the penalty doctrine out. But it helps only if it is drafted cleanly, with the Higher Rate as the rate reserved and the Lower Rate accepted for punctual payment, and it does nothing under the unfair contract terms regime. Assume the court will look through it.
- Set a margin, not a multiple. Express the Higher Rate as a fixed number of percentage points above the Lower Rate. Doubling is now the pattern courts strike down.
- Write down why. Record, when the loan is written, what the margin reflects: what the lender pays its funders or investors on a loan in default, its loss experience, and the credit risk of a defaulting borrower. That file note is the evidence the lenders in Bellas, Su and Blackbird did not have.
- Do not double-count. Whatever the indemnity and default charges already cover cannot also justify the margin. If they cover enforcement costs, the margin must rest on what is left, usually credit risk and cost of funds. If they also reach funding costs or loss of margin, as they did in Parker Wells, less is left. Do not stack default fees, “risk fees” or management fees on top.
- Narrow the trigger. Tie the Higher Rate to non-payment and other material defaults. Disregard trivial breaches. Apply it payment by payment where that suits the loan.
- Quote rates per annum. A rate expressed per month or per 30 days invites the court to annualise it and to draw its own conclusion about why it was expressed that way.
- Watch compounding. Compounding at the Higher Rate over a long default is what produced the unconscionability findings in Kellas-Sharpe and Huang.
- Keep a severance clause and a fallback. Make sure that if the Higher Rate fails, the Lower Rate plainly continues.
- Know which loans are caught by the unfair contract terms regime. For standard form loans of up to $5 million to small business borrowers, an unjustified Higher Rate is now a regulatory risk as well as a recovery risk.
None of this is a reason to waive the Higher Rate when it is properly set. A margin that reflects real default risk remains enforceable, and the cases since Paciocco make it easier, not harder, to defend one.
Table of cases
| Year | Case | Court | Lower / higher rate | Higher rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1919 | Brett v Barr Smith [1919] HCA 4; (1919) 26 CLR 87 | High Court | 5¾% pa, reducible for punctual payment | Isaacs J: a well-known “anomaly”, “firmly established” (tax case) |
| 1983 | O’Dea v Allstates Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 3; (1983) 152 CLR 359 | High Court | Rule stated by Gibbs CJ; criticised by Murphy J | |
| 1985 | Acron Pacific Ltd v Offshore Oil NL [1985] HCA 63; (1985) 157 CLR 514 | High Court | Indulgence principle restated | |
| 1990 | David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1990] FCA 148; (1990) 23 FCR 1 | Full Federal Court | +1.5% pa on default | “However anomalous”, well established; default margin upheld |
| 2005 | King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd v Hussain [2005] NSWSC 1076; (2005) 64 NSWLR 441 | NSW SC, Campbell J | 60% / 118.8% pa | Rule doubted but applied |
| 2006 | Beil v Mansell (No 2) [2006] QSC 199; [2006] 2 Qd R 499 | Qld SC, Chesterman J | 16% pa, 25% on default | Rule stated; default increase a penalty |
| 2007 | Accom Finance Pty Ltd v Mars Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 726; (2007) 13 BPR 24,729 | NSW SC, Windeyer J | 48% / 96% and 60% / 120% pa | Rule doubted; penalty not argued |
| 2008 | Bay Bon Investments Pty Ltd v Selvarajah [2008] NSWSC 1251 | NSW SC, White J | Principles for high rates | |
| 2008 | Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343; (2008) 77 NSWLR 205 | NSW CA | 48% / 96% and 60% / 120% pa | Conventional view left open; set aside under Contracts Review Act |
| 2011 | Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149 | NSW CA | Drafting explained in passing | |
| 2012 | PSAL Ltd v Kellas-Sharpe [2012] QSC 31 | Qld SC, Applegarth J | 4% / 7.5% per month | Upheld; cut to 5% as unconscionable |
| 2012 | Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR 205 | High Court | Penalties not confined to breach | |
| 2012 | Kellas-Sharpe v PSAL Ltd [2012] QCA 371; [2013] 2 Qd R 233 | Qld CA | 4% / 7.5% per month | Upheld; special leave refused [2013] HCATrans 133 |
| 2016 | Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28; (2016) 258 CLR 525 | High Court | Legitimate interest test | |
| 2016 | Stoyanova v Equity-One Mortgage Fund Ltd [2016] VSC 414 | Vic SC, Riordan J | 10.95% / 14.95% and 19.45% / 27.45% | Rule binding at first instance; summary dismissal refused |
| 2016 | Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328; (2016) 93 NSWLR 231 | NSW CA | +2% on default | Upheld |
| 2019 | Oak Capital Mortgage Fund Ltd v Dlakic [2019] NSWSC 1538 | NSW SC, Fullerton J | 9.95% / 19.5% pa | Penalty not proved; rule applied in the alternative |
| 2020 | Oxygen Funding Solutions Pty Ltd v Dick-Telfar [2020] NSWSC 582 | NSW SC, Adamson J | 4% / 10% per month | Rule stated; rates not unconscionable |
| 2021 | Bhundia v Sommers (No 4) [2021] NSWSC 455 | NSW SC, Adamson J | 30% pa on default | Not shown to be a penalty |
| 2021 | Priority Lending Australia Pty Ltd v Martinsville Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 850 | NSW SC, Adamson J | 3% / 9% per month | Triable issue |
| 2021 | Jin Lian Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v ACapital Finance Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 931 | NSW SC, Stevenson J | 14% / 22% pa | Rule applied; not in dispute |
| 2021 | Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd v Hung [2021] NSWSC 1681 | NSW SC, Meagher JA | 2.5% / 5% per month | Penalty |
| 2022 | Fayad v B & G Properties Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 129 | NSW CA | 25% / 30% pa | Upheld |
| 2022 | Hung v Aquamore Credit Equity Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 272 | NSW CA | Appeal dismissed; penalty finding not challenged | |
| 2023 | First Cash Flow Solutions Pty Ltd v Saad [2023] NSWSC 686 | NSW SC, Robb J | 2.15% / 4% per month | Rates not challenged; default fee a penalty |
| 2023 | Bellas v Powers [2023] NSWSC 1198 | NSW SC, Robb J | 1.75% / 9.75% per 30 days | Penalty |
| 2024 | Commercial N Pty Ltd v Huang [2024] NSWSC 23 | NSW SC, Henry J | 0.35% / 1.36% per week | Upheld; compounding unconscionable |
| 2025 | KF Garty Pty Ltd v Prasad [2025] QSC 91 | Qld SC, Smith J | 4% / 8% per month | Penalty |
| 2025 | JCP Holdings Pty Ltd v Ulrich Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 911 | NSW SC, Pike J | 8% per month on default | Penalty |
| 2026 | Albarran (Liquidator) v Kimberly Pearl Tours Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 877 | Federal Court, Feutrill J | 24% / 48% pa | Arguably penalty and unfair term |
| 2026 | Haiyong Su v 5 Blackman Cres Macquarie Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 875 | NSW SC, McGrath J | 2% / 3% per month | Penalty |
| 2026 | Blackbird First Mortgage Corporation Pty Ltd v Cam Engineering & Construction Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 876 | NSW SC, Muston J | 2% / 4% per month | Penalty |
| 2026 | Parker Wells Pty Ltd v Lenn Financial Services Pty Ltd [2026] QSC 207 | Qld SC, Hindman J | 2.15% / 5.65% per month | Penalty |
